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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

J. LYNN WILDE,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
J. LYNN WILDE

vs.
Case No. 970318-CA
SHERRIE D. WILDE,
Defendant/Appellant.

Appeal from Order and Findings of Fact entered on April 17,
1997 by the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod of the Third Judicial
District Court of Salt Lake County.
Kent T. Yano, #3573
Attorney for Respondent
2225 East 4800 South, Suite 109
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone: (801) 277-7331

Douglas G. Mortensen, #2329
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN &
JEPPSON, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff/
Appellant
648 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 363-2244

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Sec. 78-2a-3(2)(i) is the basis of this Court's jurisdiction
of this appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Is there a

legal basis upon which

an ex-wife may

resurrect an alimony award of seven (7) years after the seven years
has run?
2.
effective

Does the Amendment to UCA Sec. 30-3-5 which became
on May

1, 1995 apply to Plaintiff's

Petition for

additional alimony that was originally filed before May 1, 1995 but
which was amended after the effective date of the Statutory
Amendment?
3.

Should the Plaintiff have been barred by the trial court

from addressing circumstances that allegedly occurred prior to the
entry of the original Decree of Divorce?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
References to the parties' in this appeal shall be "Lynn", the
husband, and "Sherrie", the former wife.

Also, references herein

to the transcript of proceedings of the trial court shall be cited
as

R•

P•

,L•

•

Sherrie filed a second Petition to Modify the Decree of
Divorce which Decree was originally entered on June 5, 1987. This
second petition was filed in August of 1994 and was amended in
-2-

I

January of 199 6.
The original Decree awarded Sherrie alimony of $200 per month
for seven (7) years unless she remarried or other events occurred
that would, by law, terminate the award earlier.
Within the originally decreed

seven

(7) year life of

the

alimony award, Sherrie, pursuant to a Petition to Modi fy the Decree
and by stipulation by Lynn, was awarded an increase of her alimony
to $318.00 per month commencing June, 1992.

Paragraph 3 of the

Modified Decree of Divorce states that the award of alimony was to
terminate in May, 1994.

Lynn was also ordered to pay retroactive

arrearages as a result of the Court's increase of child support and
alimony and was ordered to discharge the arrearages by paying $lr>u0
per month after the oldest child attained the age of majority, or
until July, 1995.

Most of the retroactive arrearages represented

an increase of child support from $500 per month to $1200 per
month.

No request for an extension of the original seven (7) year

duration of alimony was ever made in this first Petition to Modify.
In August 1994, some four (4) months after Sherrie's alimony
had terminated in May of 1994, she again petitioned the Court to
Modify the Decree and requested additional alimony on a permanent
basis

or

until

she

was

able

to

retrain

herself

for

another

employment. .One of the reasons she cited for the increases was an
onset of rheumatoid arthritis.

Thereafter, Sherrie amended this

second Petition to Modify the Decree which Amendment was granted by
the Court in January, 1996.

This Amended Petition alleged new

facts which accused Lynn of orchestrating t .he origi na 1 < i i ^ rorce in
-3-

such a manner as to deprive Sherrie of a larger share of the
marital estate. The Amendment also restated Sherrie's request for
more alimony.
At a temporary hearing for alimony, Sherrie was awarded $800
per month by recommendation of Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett on May
1, 1995.

Said recommendation was objected to by Lynn but was

affirmed by Judge Kenneth Rigtrup on September 29, 1995.
Thereafter, Lynn attempted to terminate alimony by a Motion to
Commissioner Arnett. This Motion alleged that the May 1, 1995
Amendment to UCA 30-3-5 now prohibited the Court from modifying an
award alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist
at the time the Decree was entered.

However, Commissioner Arnett

denied the Motion because the temporary award of alimony was argued
prior to the effective date of the Amendment of May 1, 1995.
At trial Lynn presented a Motion in Limine to bar inquiry by
Sherrie into circumstances and facts that allegedly occurred prior
to the entry of the Decree of Divorce.

Judge Stephen Henriod

granted Lynn's motion basing his ruling upon res judicata plus the
failure of Sherrie to fulfill the requirements of Rule 60(b) of the
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Later

in the trial

Sherrie

admitted

that her onset of

rheumatoid arthritis commenced in May of 1994, some seven (7) years
after the Decree was entered, the same month her alimony award was
to terminate. By so testifying Sherrie admitted that her condition
did not exist at the time the Decree was entered.

Nevertheless,

Sherrie testified that until January of 1995, she worked as a
-4-

medical assistant up to sixty (60) hours per week at South Valley
Intermediate Care as the result of her obtaining post divorce
training and a certificate at the Bryman School in April of 1988.
Lynn testified that at the time of the last hearing in 1992 of
Sherriefs request for more alimony that he was earning nearly
$105,000 per year but that Sherrie and her attorney only asked for
$318 per month as alimony. R.P.129,L.9-12. Significantly, not only
did she did not request an extension of the original seven (7) year
duration of alimony, (R.P.128,L.25 and R.P.63,L.2.) she did not
allege Lynn had orchestrated events relating to the original
divorce.
Furthermore, the amount of the increase was a stipulated and
settled amount, and, therefore uncontested.
Lynn also stated his 1992 salary was $105,000 per annum and
currently totals about $120,000 per year in 1997.
After the conclusion of the trial the Court, by written
ruling, dismissed Sherrie's Amended Petition for no cause of action
reasoning

that

because

of

Sherrie•s

alimony

award,

having

terminated before the present petition was filed, there was no
legal foundation upon which to base an increase in alimony.

The

Court also ruled that the May 1, 1995 Amendments to UCA Sec.30-3-5
were applicable to the case but that the ruling would have been the
same even if the amendments had been held inapplicable.

-5-

ARGUMENT
I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THERE WAS NO
LEGAL BASIS TO AWARD SHERRIE AN INCREASE IN ALIMONY.
Sherrie waited too long to file or an increase of alimony
since, by virtue of the decree, the alimony ended three (3) months
before her second petition to modify was filed.
The case of Cole v. Cole 239 P.2d 615.(Utah 1952) denied the
ex-wife's request for more alimony that was filed some twelve years
after the original award ended by its terms. The denial was upheld
despite the fact that the trial court found a material chance of
circumstances

had occurred.

In a separate

concurring

opinion

Justice Henriod noted that the only reasonable interpretation of
the original two years award of alimony was "to fix a maximum two
year alimony paying period, after which any right to alimony would
be foreclosed unless one of the parties sought modification of the
award during such period (emphasis added).

Justice Henriod further

stated that "after the two year period had elapsed the parties were
in the same position as though alimony had not been awarded, and
the principal enunciated should control."

Cole at P.616.

In 1992 when Sherrie petitioned for and obtained an increase
of alimony from $200 per month to $318 per month Lynn was earning
about

$105/000

Interestingly,

per

year.

(R.P.128,L.5

and

R.P.69,L.22).

Sherrie and her attorney not only accepted $318 per

month as an appropriate increase, but also took the initiative in
-6-

offering to settle for that amount. R.P.128,L.11,12 & 22.

There

was no allegation by Sherrie that Lynn orchestrated the divorce in
this

first Petiton

Petition.

to Modify

that was present

in the

second

It is, therefore, highly questionable that Lynn did

anything wrong as is alleged in the Amended Petition.
Furthermore, although there was ample time and opportunity to
request an extension of the seven (7) year award, Sherrie and her
attorney failed to do so.

R.P.63,L.2.

The legislature has given an indication of its support of
Lynn's argument that a recipient of alimony must act during the
life of the award:

UCA 30-3-5(7) (h) imposes a limit upon the

duration of an alimony award to the term of years of the marriage
"unless, at any time prior to the termination of alimony/ the Court
finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment for a
longer period of time" (emphasis added).

See also Family Law in

Utah at P.149,150.
With alimony having ended, the logical conclusion is that Lynn
and Sherrie became strangers, legally speaking, after May of 1994.
There was no legal Relationship that existed between them that
would justify a resurrection of Sherrie's alimony award.
ARGUMENT
II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE AMENDMENTS
TO UCA 30-3-5 WHICH BECAME EFFECTIVE MAY 1, 1995
WERE APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.
The second Petition to Modify was filed by Sherrie in August
-7-

of 1994.

The Amended Petition to Modify was granted by Court in

January,

1996.

The

Amended

Petition

raised

new

allegations

concerning Lynn's alleged conduct that were not contained in the
August 1994 Petition nor in the 1992 Petition.

Thus, the Court

ruled that the new amendments to UCA 30-3-5 apply.

Therefore, the

"new" UCA 30-3-5 (7)(g)(ii) provides that "the Court may not modify
alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address needs of the
recipient that did not exist at the time the Decree was entered,
unless the Court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that
action."
It is unarguable that Sherrie did not contract rheumatoid
arthritis until May, 1994. (R.P.37,L.7 and R.P.63,L.7, and R.P.74,
1.4) some seven (7) years after the entry of the original decree.
Therefore, Sherrie's affliction did not exist at the time the
Decree

was

entered.

The

question

remains,

did

extenuating

circumstances exist to justify a modification as required by the
statute?
Family Law in Utah/ second edition, by Katherine and Stephen
Black at P.149 takes the position that "Presumably, the legislature
decided that subsequent illnesses, accidents, mishaps or bad luck
should not be the responsibility of the previous spouse without a
showing

of

extenuating

responsibility,

on

the

circumstances

justifying

spouse."

extenuating

An

imposing

the

circumstance

imposing upon an ex-husband to pay alimony that was previously
waived is illustrated by a situation where a husband, who agreed to
pay debts of his wife if she agreed to waive alimony "now and
-8-

forever" and where he later defaults on that agreement, the wife is
not held to her waiver and she may thereafter receive alimony.
Kinsman v. Kinsman, 748 P.2d 210, 212-13 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
In Sherrie's case, she testified that Lynn did not cause her
arthritic condition R.P.73,L.22-25 & R.P.74,L.l.

Sherrie also had

not applied for any other employment for over a year prior to the
trial.

(R.P.72,L.22-24).

Furthermore, Lynn pays for his adult

son's schooling, tuition and automobiles. R.P.73,L.10-17.
Despite

Sherrie's

allegation

in August

of

1994 that

her

condition prevented her from working, she in fact was employed at
her same job until March of 1996 (R.P.92,L.10), some two (2) years
after the onset of her arthritis.
her

temporary

alimony

of

$800.00

Nevertheless, Sherrie obtained
per

month

in May

of

1995.

Furthermore, one reason given for Sherrie's job termination was
because her 'employer believed she was manipulating time sheets
(R.P.60,L.24 & 25, R.P.61,L.1-6) and not because of her arthritic
condition.
Nevertheless, with apparently full knowledge of her medical
condition, Sherrie voluntarily placed a second mortgage on her home
in December of 1994. (R.P.67,L.21, R.P.68,L.11). Furthermore, even
at trial, with no employment for at least one (1) year with just an
alimony of $800.00 per month, Sherrie was able to remain current on
that second mortgage debt and was not being legally pursued by
creditors. (R.P.68,L.21-25).
Lynn, pursuant to all prior Court orders of payment, was
current in all his obligations to pay alimony to Sherrie. (R.P.133,
-9-

L.21-25/ R.P.134,L.l & 2.)
Nothing in the record indicates that Lynn ever did anything to
cause Sherrie's economic or medical condition.

Thus, it is an

inescapable conclusion that no extenuating circumstances exist that
would justify imposing additional alimony obligations upon Lynn.
Lynn's only "fault" was becoming financially successful after the
divorce.

ARGUMENT
III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED AN ATTEMPT BY SHERRIE
TO PRESENT FACTS AND EXHIBITS CONCERNING ISSUES THAT MAY
HAVE EXISTED PRIOR TO THE ENTRY OF THE DIVORCE.
Lynn presented to the trial court a Motion in Limine seeking
to prevent

Sherrie from re-opening and presenting

matters existing prior to the Decree.

evidence on

She alleged, in her Amended

Petition that Lynn orchestrated the divorce and in such a manner as
to deprive Sherrie of her legitimate share of the marital estate.
The trial court properly granted Lynn's Motion in Limine, The case
of Jacobsen v. Jacobsen 703 P.2d (Utah 1985) held:

"When there has

been an adjudication it becomes res judicata as to those issues
which were either tried and determined or upon all issues which the
parties' had a fair opportunity to present and have determined in
other proceedings." Accord, Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d
121 (Utah App 1988.)
Sherrie now raises allegations of Lynn's alleged deceit in
-10-

this second petition to modify, but did not do so in her 1992
Petition to Modify.

Furthermore Rule 60(b) of the Rules of Civil

Procedure requires definite time limits be adhered to in attempting
to set aside a judgment or an independent action for fraud upon the
Court.

None of Sherrie's pleadings conformed to the requirements

imposed by Rule 60(b).
Sherrie's

evidence

at

trial

was

properly

limited

to

circumstances occurring from the last order of modification. After
hearing all the evidence, the Court found that Sherrie's arthritic
condition was a material change of circumstance that did not exist
at the time of the entry of the Decree and that Lynn had the
ability

to

pay

the

requested

increase

of

alimony.

However,

Sherrie's Petition to Modify was, untimely filed and, therefore,
properly dismissed.
Interestingly, Sherrie, while arguing the "new" May 1, 1995
Amendments to UCA 30-3-5 do not apply to this case, tried to argue
the "new" 30-3-5 (7)(i) which provides that when a long marriage
dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the income of one
of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change
shall

be

considered

in

R.P.15,L.22-25, P.16,L.1-5.

determining

the

amount

of

alimony.

See trial brief of Sherrie Wilde, at

P.13.
Of course, upon Res judicata grounds, the Court disallowed
this inquiry.

Furthermore a detailed reading of this amendment

seems to apply to a Trial Court's analysis to original divorce
cases but not to petitions to modify.
-11-

CONCLUSION
Lynn does not dispute that Sherrie contracted rheumatoid
arthritis in approximately May of 1994. Nor does he dispute that
Sherrie was unemployed at the time of trial.

Rather, Lynn's

position is that Sherrie's petition for a second increase of
alimony was not timely filed.

Any relief Sherrie wanted from the

Court should have been filed prior to May of 1994.

Sherrie's

alimony award cannot arise from the grave of Lazarus.

Throughout

the law, time limitations and constraints are placed upon all
litigants.

Changes of circumstances, no matter how meritorious

cannot justify creating an exception to these limitations where the
ex-husband is not a causal factor in the change of circumstance.
The policy of the law

and the time limits for taking action

indicates the desire and need for finality.

The burden was on

Sherrie both in 1992 and prior to May of 1994 to Petition the Court
for the relief she now seeks.

She did not meet this burden.

The

judgment of the trial court in dismissing Sherrie's Complaint
should be affirmed and Lynn should be awarded all costs and
reasonable attorney fees incurred in this appeal.
Respectfully submitted this /(O

day of : ^

, 1998.

KMTTTYAJIO

Attorney fo^Respondent,
J. Lynn Wilde
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

/>
/ fo

O
/
day of ^ ^ ^ ^

I certify that on the
/ 1998 a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Respondent/s ^rief was mailed via
U.S. Mail to the following:
Douglas G. Mortensen
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
648 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

'RENT T.(^ANO

Attorney for Respondent
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ADDENDUM
Contents of Addendum
June 5, 1987 Decree of Divorce;
Stipulation to Modify Decree, June 3, 1992;
Family Law in Utah, Pages 149,150;
See Addendum to Appellant's Brief for the following:
a.

June 24, 1992 Modified Decree of Divorce.

b.

August 23, 1994 Verified Petition to Modify Decree of
Divorce.

c.

January 24, 1996 Amended Petition to Modify Decree.

d.

March 25, 1997 Judge Henriod's Minute Entry Decision.

e.

April 17, 1997 Order on Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law.

f.

UCA Section 30-3-5 (in effect prior to May 1, 1995).

g.

UCA Section 30-3-5 (effective May 1, 1995).

Family Law in Utah;
Excerpts, pages 149,150.
Trial Brief of Defendant Sherrie D. Wilde.
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ADDENDUM
THE ORIGINAL DECREE OF DIVORCE

FILED IN Clu-HK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah
GEORGE E. BROWN, JR. [A3611]
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f
7001 S o u t h 900 E a s t , S u i t e 340
M i d v a l e , UT 84047
Telephone:
(801) 562-5555

JUN 5 1987
H. Dlxop
Dixon Hindley,
Hindle^Cler*
0 > 1 Court
C<
7Cler>t 3rd OJaf.

Deputy Qi('<

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

J. LYNN WILDE,
DECREE OF DIVORCE
Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No.(fb86-oT92i^
Civil No. D86-03984

SHERRIE D. WILDE,
Defendant.

The above entitled matter came up for hearing before the
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, one of the judges of the above
entitled court, at the hour of 4:30 p.m. on the 28th day of
May, 1987.
Plaintiff was present along with his attorney, George E.
Brown, Jr.

Defendant was present, and was represented by her

attorney, Richard Nemelka.
The parties stipulated in open court before the judge to the
terms of this divorce.

Following the stipulation of the

parties, the defendant was excused and the plaintiff was placed
under oath and gave testimony.

Based upon the stipulation of

the parties and the testimony of the'•plaintiff the Court now
enters its Decree of Divorce.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce to become

final upon entry.

2.

Plaintiff and defendant are bona fide residents of Salt

Lake County, State of Utah, and have been for more than three
months prior to the commencement of this action.
3.

Plaintiff and defendant are husband and wife, having

been married at Salt Lake City, UT, on the 26th day of June,
1963,
4.
to-wit:

Five children have been born as issue of this marriage,
Three children have reached the age of majority and

left the home.

Two minor children are left in the home:

Michael Andrew Wilde, born April 18, 1975; and Christopher Paul
Wilde, born July 27, 1977.

Defendant is awarded the sole care,

custody and control of the minor children, subject to liberal
rights of visitation in plaintiff.
5.

During the course of the marriage defendant has treated

plaintiff cruelly, causing him great mental distress and
suffering and making continuation of the marriage relationship
impossible.
6.

During the course of the marriage the parties have

acquired an interest in certain real property, towit:

the real

property and residence located at 2590 Sundance Drive, Sandy, UT
84092.

Defendant is awarded the ownership and possession of

said real property and residence and receive all equity therein
and that defendant have possession until the lienholders require
defendant to vacate the premises.
1.

During the course of the marriage, the parties have

acquired certain items of personal property.
property of the parties is awarded as follows:
2

The personal

a.

To the plaintiff:

The pool table, the motorcycle,

his own personal clothes, his tools, his tennis racquet, his
bowling ball, his own personal effects and belongings, and
any interest in his automobile provided by his employer,
b.

To the defendant:

All personal property of the

parties not specifically listed above in paragraph 6a and
including a 1986 Hyundai automobile,
8.

During the course of the marriage, the parties have

incurred certain debts and obligations.

The plaintiff is

ordered to hold harmless and indemnify the defendant pertaining
to all debts on the real property, including mortgages of the
parties and all taxes,
9.

Plaintiff is ordered to pay to defendant the sum of

$250.00 per month per child for a total of $500.00 per month as
child support for the benefit of the parties' minor children
until such time as each child shall attain the age of 18 years
or graduate from high school, whichever event shall last occur.
In the event that plaintiff is delinquent in payment of child
support, it shall be appropriate for the defendant to utilize
the provisions of UCA, Title 78, Chapter 45d in order to collect
delinquent child support through appropriate income withholding
procedures.
10.

Defendant is ordered to pay to plaintiff the sum of

$200.00 per month as and for alimony for seven (7) years, or
until the defendant remarries or any other event occurs which
pursuant to law would terminate alimony, including the death of
the defendant.
3

11.

Plaintiff is ordered to maintain a comprehensive policy

of health and accident insurance for the benefit of the parties '
minor children until such time as each child shall attain the
age of 18 years or graduate from high school, whichever event
shall last occur if the plaintiff can obtain the insurance at a
reasonable cost.

Any medical expenses incurred in behalf of the

minor children such as dental, optical, orthodontics,
deductibles, or other costs not covered by such insurance shall
be borne equally by the plaintiff and the defendant.
12.

Plaintiff is ordered to maintain a policy of insurance

on his life in the face amount of $50,000.00, naming the
parties' minor children as the sole, irrevocable beneficiaries
until such time as each child shall attain the age of 18 years
or graduate from high school, whichever event shall last occur.
13.

Plaintiff is ordered to pay $600.00 to defendant for

her expenses incurred for attorney's fees.
14.

Plaintiff shall be able to claim the two minor children

of the parties as tax exemptions until the defendant makes
$6,000.00 in taxable income per year, at which time the
defendant shall be able to claim one child as a tax deduction
and at such time as the defendant makes $9,000.00 taxable income
per year, she shall be able to claim both minor children as tax
deductions.
15.

Plaintiff and defendant are ordered to sign all

documents necessary to effect the terms of this divorce.
16.

It is ordered that Case No. D86-3984 be consolidated

4

i n t o Case No. D86-03929 and t h a t t h i s Decree of D i v o r c e be
controlling

in both Qases.

DATED t h i s _JT_ d^y

Qf

Way f 1987.

[entoeth. R i g t r u p T j
) i s i t r i c t C o u r t Q/u dge

H. D I X O N h':N
CL-i£RK
MAILING CERTIFICATE

<^&
H c - r y t r ; P.V.»r{(

o

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy,
postage prepaid, of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and Decree of Divorc^ i n the above matter on the rf] day of May,
1987, to the following individual:
Richard Nemelka
Attorney for Defendant
2046 East 4800 South #103
Salt Lake City, UT 84117

I CERTIFY TOT THIS 15 A J ? ^ J W V OF { J
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT 0" ' ^ - t W J J J ™ * °
DISTRICT COURT. SALT LAKE C0UKT>, STAT

DATE
to|ll|j7
— O ^

:^ERT
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ADDENDUM
STIPULATION RESOLVING THE FIRST PETITION TO MODIFY

GEORGE E. BROWN, JR. [A3611]
7001 South 900 East, Suite 250
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone: (801) 562-5555
Attorney for Plaintiff J. Lynn Wilde
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
J. LYNN WILDE,
Plaintiff,

STIPULATION

vs .

Civil No. 86-4903929

SHERRIE D. WILDE

Judge Rigtrup

Defendant.
Plaintiff, individually and by and through his attorney,
George E. Brown, Jr., and Defendant, individually, and by and
through her attorney, Richard S. Nemelka, hereby agree and
stipulate as follows:
1.

That effective June 1, 1992, the Decree of Divorce may

be ammended and modified pursuant to the terms of this
Stipulation with all other provisions of the Decree not referred
to herein to remain in full force and effect.
2.

That the Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendant child

support in the sum of One Thousand Two Hundred Dollars
($1,200.00) per month for the two minor children to begin in the
month of June, 1992, until the two minor children reach the age
of 18 or their normal high school class graduates, whichever
occurs last.

3.

That the Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendant alimony

in the sum of Three Hundred Eighteen Dollars ($318.00) per month
to begin in June, 1992, until it terminates in May, 1994, but
the Defendant shall only be required to pay a total of One
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($1,500.00) per month towards
child support and alimony and the Eighteen Dollars ($18.00) of
alimony per month for 24 months for a total of Four Hundred
Thirty Two Dollars ($432.00) shall accrue to be paid at such
time when the child support obligation is decreased based upon
one of the children reaching the age of 18 or his normal school
class graduating from high school whichever occurs last.
4.

That the Defendant shall be awarded judgment for the

sura of Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Nine Dollars and
Twenty Cents ($8,179.20) with interest accruing thereon at the
rate of eight percent (8%) per annum.

Said amount

represents

the increase in child support retroactive back to June, 1991,
the date the Petition was filed by the Defendant, for a total of
12 months at the sum of Six Hundred Eighty One Dollars and Sixty
Cents ($681.60) per month.

Further, the Defendant shall be

stayed from executing upon said judgment as long as the
Plaintiff pays to the Defendant the sum of $1,500.00 per month.
Said judgment shall be satisfied by the Plaintiff continuing to
pay the sum of $1,500.00 per month after the child support
monthly payments are reduced based upon the oldest child reaches
the age of 18 or his normal high school class graduates,
whichever occurs last.

That said $1,500.00 per month payments

shall continue until the aforementioned judgment, including
2

accrued interest and the accrued alimony of $18,00 per month for
24 months have been paid in full.
5.

Based upon the Stipulation of the parties that the

Plaintiff will pay $1,200.00 per month in child support for the
two minor children; $318.00 per month for alimony, ($18.00 per
month accruing for 24 months for a total of $432.00); and
retroactive child support in the amount of $8,179.20 at 8%
interest; the Plaintiff will pay $1,500.00 per month in child
support and alimony through September, 1994.

In October of

1994, the Plaintiff will pay $104.26 representing the final
payment on the retroactive child support and accrued interest,
$432.00 representing the accrued alimony, and $698.00
representing the child support on the minor child, Christopher,
for a total of $1,130.00.

In November, 1994, the Plaintiff will

pay the Defendant $698.00 in child support for the minor child,
Christopher.

The payment of $698.00 shall continue

through

July, 1995 when Christopher reaches the age of 18 which is after
his normal high school class has graduated.
6.

That the Defendant shall be awarded judgment against

the Plaintiff for the sum of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) in
attorney's fees to be paid at Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per
month beginning June, 1992, with the same accruing interest at
the rate of 12% per annum.
7.

That the Plaintiff shall be allowed to claim the minor

child, Christopher, as a dependent for income tax purposes.

3

Defendant shall sign any and all documents necessary to meet
Internal Revenue Service requirements for the Plaintiff to take
the tax exemption.
8.

That the Plaintiff shall pay 70% of all medical,

dental, orthodontic, optical and therapeutic expenses incurred
on behalf of the minor children that are not covered by
insurance.

The Defendant shall pay 30% of all medical expenses

not covered by insurance.
9.

That all child support and alimony payments shall be

paid one-half (1/2) by the 5th and one-half (1/2) by the 20th of
each month.
10.

That in the event the Plaintiff is more than thirty

days (30) in arrears in the payment of any child support or
alimony payment that the Defendant shall be entitled to a wage
and withholding order pursuant to statute.
DATED

this

J>

day

of

Sfe
17

'•ft

,

1992.

SHERRIE D. WILDE, Defendant

Attorney for Plaintiff

D57STIPULAT

RICHARD S. NEMELKA
Attorney for Defendant
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conditioned on the performance by defendant of paying the agreed
liabilities. When defendant willfully avoided his required performance
through bankruptcy, he failed to perform the condition precedent.491
Failure of a material condition precedent relieves the other party of any
obligation to perform.492 The stipulated agreement will not be enforceable
against plaintiff. The court should look to the present condition and needs
of the parties and modify its order if necessary.493
Interestingly, 30-3-5 (7) (g)(ii) added that the court may not modify
alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address needs of the recipient
that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds
extenuating circumstances that justify that action. Presumably, the
legislature decided that subsequent illnesses, accidents, mishaps or bad luck
should not be the responsibility of the previous spouse without a showing
of extenuating circumstances justifying imposing the responsibility on the
spouse.

R.

Modifications that Extend Alimony for a Period Longer
than the Duration of the Marriage

p Code
30-3-5(7) (h) Alimony may not be orderedfor a duration longer than the number ofyears that
the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds
I extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time.

Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the
number of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to
termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that
justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time. This puts a
further restriction on modification by requiring that modification for a
period of time longer than the number of years the marriage lasted must
occur, if at all, prior to termination.

See, e.g., Kinsman v. Kinsman, 748 P.2d 210, 212-13 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Kinsman v. Kinsman, 748 P.2d 210, 213 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Kinsman v. Kinsman, 748 P.2d 210,213 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
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This creates a trap for unwary practitioners. Prior to passage of
§ 30-3-5(7)(h), the Supreme Court had held that a wife in her mid-fifties,
with little or no work experience, should be awarded permanent alimony.
N o w , unless the court finds extenuating circumstances to the contrary, she
will be awarded alimony for a duration equal to or less than the length of
the marriage. A twenty year marriage could result in a twenty year
alimony award. This seems fair, but if the recipient spouse whose only
support is alimony lives longer than age 75 (age 55 plus 20 yrs.), her only
source of income will cut out.
In addition, women who are the same age and who have the same
work experience could get vastly different treatment simply because they
have been married for different lengths of time. Practitioners who fail to
ask for a finding justifying permanent alimony will do their clients a grave
disservice.
A modification can be obtained provided that the recipient
discovers the problem before the alimony terminates. If the two women
in the previous paragraph were neighbors and happened to discover the
problem together, one may be barred (because she did not seek
modification before the previous award terminates) and the other able to
modify her alimony award.

S.

Termination

Upon

Remarriage

i- Code
30-3-5(8) Unless a decree ofdivorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that
a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage of that
former spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ah initio, payment
ofalimony shall resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment
and his rights are determined.

Prior to 1995, in reinstating alimony after an annulment, the courts
relied on the language of § 30-3-5(3) which read: "The court has continuing
jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the support and
maintenance of the parties." In 1995, this section was renumbered
30-3-5 (7) (g), and the language was changed to:
(i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes
and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material

ADDENDUM
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL BRIEF

Douglas G. Mortensen, #2329
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON
Attorneys for Defendant
648 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 363-2244
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

J. LYNN WILDE,

TRIAL BRIEF
OF DEFENDANT
SHERRIE D.WILDE

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 864903929DA
SHERRIE D. WILDE,
Judge Stephen Henriod
Defendant.

In support of her Amended Petition to Modify Divorce Decree, defendant Sherrie D.
Wilde submits this trial brief.

INTRODUCTION
J. Lynn Wilde ("Lynn") and Sherrie D. Wilde ("Sherrie") were married to each other
for 25 years. Their union produced five children, all of whom are now adults. The parties
were divorced on June 8, 1987.

One month after their divorce, Lynnfs debts were discharged in bankruptcy.
Thereafter, a business with which Lynn had been affiliated for several years - Beneficial
hitemational - rapidly prospered. Lynn began to enjoy great wealth. Later, Sherrie's health
began to deteriorate. In the spring of 1994, her health was suddenly and seriously
compromised by what was thereafter diagnosed as rheumatoid arthritis. Since then, her
condition has worsened dramatically and she is no longer able to maintain gainful
employment At present, her monthly expenses far exceed Lynn's alimony obligation to her
and she is dependent upon Welfare assistancefromthe LDS Church to maintain herself.
In this action, Sherrie seeks an increase in alimony and an Order making such alimony
permanent. In addition, Sherrie asks that the divorce decree be modified to award her a
reasonable, equitable share of assets acquired by Lynn as a result of profit-motivated, wealthbuilding efforts expended by him during the marriage. Sherrie also seeks to recover the costs
and reasonable attorney's fees she has incurred in this action,

CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS
June 26* 1962* The parties married in the Salt Lake LDS Temple. During the
ensuing 14 years, Sheme gave birth to five children.
May 6,1985; Lynnfilesa petition for individual banloruptcy (Case No. 85A-01481).
-
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May 28,1986: Lynn's Chapter 13 bankruptcy action is dismissed.
August 1, 1986;

Lynn files a new Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition, Case

No. 86A-02705-JHA.
September 29, 1986: Lynn files for divorce from Sherrie.
June 8, 1987: The parties' divorce decree is entered, terminating their 25 year
marriage.
July 8,1987: All of Lynn's debts are discharged through his bankruptcy action.
June 24,1992: Divorce decree is modified.
August 23,1994: Sherrie files petition to modify alleging material and substantial
changes in circumstances since the June 1992 decree modification, including a substantial
increase in Lynn's income; a substantial decrease in Sherries income; Sherrie's contraction
of rheumatoid arthritis, resulting in substantial increase in her monthly expenses and a
decrease in her capacity to maintain gainful employment. Her petition seeks "additional
alimony on a permanent basis or until she is able to retrain herself for another employment".
May 1,1995: Commissioner Arnett issues Minute Entry recommending that Lynn
be required to pay Shenie $800.00 per month in temporary alimony during the pendency of
her petition to modify to the decree. Lynn objects to the recommendation and the matter
goes to Judge Rigtrup.
- 3 -

September 29,1995: Judge Rigtrup issues Minute Entry adopting Commissioner
Arnett's recommendation. His Minute Entry states, inter alia:
The Court has considered the long duration of the marriage, the
medical needs and health limitations of defendant and the large
disparity of the incomes of the parties. . . . [I]t is clear to the
Court that defendant has demonstrated needs she is incapable of
meeting on her own. There is an identifiable tax benefit through
the payment of alimony which lessens the actual burden to the
obligor. Plaintiff as a principal in Beneficial International, Inc.,
is in a position to enjoy prerequisites of employment which
effectively enhance his real income. Plaintiff is in a better
position than defendant to exploit creative juggling in managing
his personal finances
October 5, 1995; Formal order reflecting Judge Rigtrup's ruling is signed and
entered. It expressly states that the decision to grant $800.00 per month temporary alimony
effective March 1, 1995 "shall in no way interfere with the trial court's discretion to make
any percnanent modification retroactive to the time of sendee of the petition to modify."
November 1, 1995: Sherrie seeks leave to amend her petition to include the
allegation that she may be entitled to an equitable share of Lynn's present wealth due to its
having originated in efforts expended by him during the marriage. Sherrie's proposed
amended petition alleges that Lynn did substantial groundwork for amassing his present
assets while he was married to her and that he minimized his earnings then in order to reduce
his marital obligation and burdens. She further alleges this enabled him to thereafter
-
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accelerate thefruitionof the wealth-building plans formulated and put into action during his
marriage to her. Her request to modify is based on part on her receipt of an unsigned,
typewritten note suggesting inquiry into Lynn's assets. The note, placed in her mailbox,
stated:
Multi-million dollar public corp. controlling interest and stock
owned by partnership - did not have at time of divorce.
Bankrupt? So, when did he get stock? How? If he purchased
it where did he get the money, and when? If it was given to
him, did he claim it on taxes?
After receiving this note, Sherrie caused her counsel to conduct investigation which led her
to beheve that Lynn orchestrated his divorce and bankruptcy actions in a manner to deprive
her of a share of his interest in stock in Beneficial International and other related business
entities.
January 29,1996: This Court grants Shenie's motion for leave to amend her petition
to modify.
July 3,1996: Sherrie files certification of readiness for trial.

ISSUES PRESENTED
L

Has there been a substantial change of circumstances warranting an increase

in the amount and duration of alimony?
-
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2.

Does Sherrie havefinancialneeds she is unable to meet?

3.

Does Lynn have the ability to meet Sherrie's financial needs?

4.

Should the divorce decree be modified to award Sherrie a reasonable, equitable

share of assets and wealth acquired by Lynn as a result of efforts expended during the parties'
marriage?
GERMANE FACTS
During the first 20 years of their marriage, the parties enjoyed a favorable lifestyle
and standard of living. They purchased their first home within a couple of years after their
marriage. Their second home was built specially for them in the Willow Creek area. They
later movedfromthat home into another home in the Willow Creek area which had been one
of the Home Show homes.
During their marriage, the parries vacationed in Hawaii, California, Las Vegas and
St. George. They took their family to St George at Easter every year for a 1 week vacation.
They went to Disneyland. They stayed several times at Vacation Village in Southern
California. Each of their children was given a car when he or she reached driving age. Each
was awarded a vacation trip for high school graduation. Two of their sons were taken to
Hawaii, one with a friend. Lynn paid for their daughter's graduation trip to the Virgin Islands
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with heT friends. The parties1 daughter took piano and dancing lessons. Their sons played
tennis and golf. All of their children skied and owned ski equipment
Four years after the parties married, Lynn received his Bachelors Degree from the
University of Utah in Fine Arts. He worked in commercial ait, designing and constructing
electric signs. For approximately 10 years, he owned his own sign company. In 1979, he
co-founded Western Heritage Thrift and Loan, In 1982, his employment with Western
Heritage was terminated. From that time until he filed for divorce in September of 1986,
Lynn Wilde's reported income was considerably less than it had been during the first 20
years of the parties marriage.
Shortly after leaving Western Heritage, Lynn became affiliated with Beneficial
International, a health and beauty products company. He traveled extensively, appearing at
trade shows. He was given a substantial block of stock in the company and in time became
one of its two principals. He has been a director of the company since at least 1984 - three
years before his divorce was entered.
The condition of the company and the value of his interest in it at the time of the
divorce is not clear. What is clear, however, is that shortly after the divorce was finalized
and Lynn's debts were discharged in bankruptcy, die business began prospering. Its
prosperity has increased steadily since the mid-1980's.
- 7 -

Audited financial statements of Beneficial International reflect a near phenomenal
growth in prosperity, including thesefiguresfor recent financial years ending January 31:

YEARS

TOTAL
ASSETS

RETAINED
EARNINGS

1990

$400,291.00

$150,650.00

1991

$467,922.00

$245,806.00

j

|

1992

$1,246,598.00

$563,088.00

1

1

1.993

$1,209,513.00

$615,882.00

|

1994

$1,247,850.00

$817,329.00

,

1995

,

$1,480,267.00

,

$707,824.00

|

1996

!

$1,547,195.00

l_

$878,972.00

,

Lynn Wilde is the president and chief executive officer of Beneficial International.
The company owns a large huilding and warehouse comprising 28,000 square feet in Salt
Lake. The assessed value of the property is $460,900. The company is the parent
corporation of several wholly owned subsidiaries. Lynn holds some 4,554,793 shares of
stock in Beneficial International. The corporation is publicly held and listed with NASDAQ.
Its shares have traded within the last year for 7 0 a share. Lynn's stock (comprising 27% of
the outstanding shares of the company) at that price would have a value of $318,836.00.

-
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Lynn earns a monthly salary of $8,770.00. His 1996 W-2 income was $112,617.00.
In addition to his take home draws and bonuses, he is provided a vehicle (Mercedes) and his
transportation and car insurance expenses are paid by the company. He also enjoys full
health benefits, through the company. He owns and lives in a condominium in Bountiful
having an appraised value, as of last year, of $236,000. It contains a hot tub, sauna, big
screen TV, two other TVs and two VCRTs. In July of 1995, Lynn purchased a lot in North
Salt Lake for $97,000 in cash. He intends to build a home on that lot. Last Christmas, he
took 8 people to Hawaii for a week vacation.
In contrast, Sherrie has becomefinanciallydestitute. Due to a dramatic worsening
of her rheumatoid arthritis, Sherrie has been unable to work, even part time. She is at present
unemployed, uninsured and uninsurable. Her monthly medical expenses exceed $800.00.
They are likely to increase. She has received food from the Bishop's Storehouse of the LDS
Church. Since January of 1996, some $9,907.00 of her other living expenses (mortgage
obligations, utility payments, etc.) have been paid by her bishop through her ward's welfare
program since January 1996 alone.
Contending that Sherrie is not as ill or debilitated as she claims, Lynn demanded an
independent medical exam. The independent physician he selected was Dr. W. Patrick
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Knibbe. Dr. Knibbe examined Shenie in January of 1996. His January 19, 1996 medical
report states:
This patient has uncontrolled rheumatoid arthritis . . . which
bodes poorly for her ultimate prognosis . . . . The outlook for
her health related expenses is that she is likely to require surgery
on her feet, knees and hands eventually and currently she is
limiting her prescription drug use based on the expense involved
with these medications....
I would advocate financial support in the form of health
insurance for this patient as a bare niinimum of support if at all
possible. Other ancillary services such as occupational therapy,
physical therapy or orthotics, hand splints, and a regular
exercise program are all part of a good program of treatment of
rheumatoid arthritis and these are services this patient cannot
afford at this point.
(See Exhibit A attached to Shenie Wilde's April 15,1996 Affidavit herein).

ARGUMENT
I.
REVISED § 30-3-5(7)(g) DOES NOT APPLY TO
SHERRIE'S REQUEST FOR INCREASED, EXTENDED
ALIMONY. EVEN IF IT DID, IT WOULD NOT BAR
SHERRIES CLAIM.
In 1995, the Utah Legislature revised portions of Chapter 3, Title 30 of the Utah
Code. Hie revisions became effective May 1,1995. They included § 30-3-5(7)(g)(ii) which
provides:

- io -

The Court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for
alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the
time the decree was entered, unless the Court finds extenuating
circumstances that justify that action,1
Lynn contends that this provision precludes this court from increasing or extending
the duration of Sherrie's alimony.
Lynn argues that because Sherrie's pending petition to modify was amended after May
1, 1995, this statute applies. This contention is erroneous because the amendment to
Shenie's petition to modify does not concern alimony. It concerns redistribution of property
and a claim against Lynn's post divorce accumulation of wealth based on his wealth-building
efforts during the inaiiiage. The cited revised subsection of § 30-3-5 concerns alimony only
and has no impact on this claim.
Although Shenie's amended petition does reassert her claim for alimony, the relation
back doctrine of Rule 15(c) expressly preserves that claim as relating back to Hie date of the
filing of her original petition to modify (August 19, 1994):
Whenever the claim... asserted in the amended pleading arose
out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or

The intended meaning of this subsection is difficult to discern•
immediately preceding subsection states almost its apposite:
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make
substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony
based on a substantial material change in circumstances
not foreseeable at the time o£ the divorce.
- 11 -

The

attempted to be set forth in the original pleading the amendment
relates back to the date of the original pleading.
Rule 15(c), URCP.
Even if the recently revised version of § 30-3-5(7)(g) did apply, it would not defeat
Sheme's alimony claim. This section does not preclude an increase in the amount or
duration of alimony to address needs that did not exist at the time of the divorce. It merely
provides that such increase must be based on afindingof "extenuating circumstances". If
Sherrie's situation does not present "extenuating circumstances", no situation does. Her
circumstances are extenuated in the extreme.
The version of § 30-3-5 in effect at the time the parties were divorced contained the
following provision as Subsection 3:
The Court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent
changes or new orders for the support and maintenance of the
parties . . . or the distribution of the property . . . as is
reasonable and necessary.
(See Exhibit A, attached)
This Court has full diccretionary power and authority to make whatever changes or
new orders it considers reasonable and necessary concerning alimony and distribution of
property.
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n.
ALTHOUGH THE NEW STATUTORY REVISIONS DO
NOT APPLY TO SHERRIES ALIMONY CLAIM
(ASSERTED BEFORE THE AMENDMENTS BECAME
EFFECTIVE), THEY DO APPLY TO HER PROPERTY
DISTRIBUTION CLAIM (FIRST ASSERTED AFTER
THE AMENDMENTS).
The recent revisions to §30-3-5 include a revised subsection (e). That subsection
states:
When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of
a major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the
collective efforts of both, that change shall be considered in
dividing the marital property and in determining the amount of
alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been gTeatly
enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the
marriage, the Court may make a compensating adjustment in
dividing the marital property and awarding alimony.
This subsection like the rest of the revisions, became effective on May 1, 1995. It
applies to Sherrie's request for a compensating adjustment in the property division because
she first attempted to assert that claim on November 1, 1995 - 6 months after the statute
became effective. The court granted her leave to add that claim to her petition to modify on
January 29, 1996.
The Wilde marriage was a marriage of long duration - 25 years. It "dissolved" on the
threshold of a major change in the income of Lynn Wilde. During the marriage, the parties
endured great financial hardships while Lynn undertook to build the business which
- 13
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gradually brought him great, increasing prosperity. His present wealth is a result of the
groundwork he laid during the last several years of his marriage. During those years, the
Wilde family experiencedfinancialdifficulties they never had previously known. Lynn's
having received a discharge of his debts in bankraptcy simultaneous with the dissolution of
his marriage attests to his having achieved a fresh financial start. The prosperity that
followed was a result of his efforts during his marriage to Sherrie. Sherrie should be granted
a share of the wealth resultingfromhis industry during the marriage. Lynn's wealth-building
efforts during the last few years of the marriage occasioned sacrifices and hardship to
Sherrie.
Tf the other revision applies, this one likewise applies. It is expressly supportive of
the claim Sherrie seeks to assert.
DATED MsjtO

day of March, 1997.
v

Douelas^j. Moi
Douglas^?.
Mortensen
MATHESON, MORTpkSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C.
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the 20th day of March, 1997 a true and accurate copy of the foregoing
was sent via facsimile and hand delivered to the following:
Kent T. Yano - fax no. 277-7334
2225 East 4800 South, #109
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117

Wilde\Trialbrf.def
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CHAPTER 257
H-B. No. 125
passed February 25,1991
Approved March 18, 1991
Effective April 29, 1991

service of a copy of a c»urt order under Sections
30-3-5 or 30-4-3 thai the debtors are divorced or
living separately under an order for separate main*
tenance, and wno has been expressly advised of the

separate, current addresses of the debtors either by
the court order orbyjther written notice, shall pro*
vla'e to the debtors individually all statements, notices, and other similar correspondence required by
law or by the contract.

CREDIT OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES
By David M. Jones
x. <cTtU5LATJXGTODJVOHCEAWDSEPAUXTE MAINTENANCE? PROVIDING FOR
THE DIVISION OF DEBTS AND OBLIGATONS OF THE PARTIES; CLARIFYING
rERTAJN RIGHTS AND DUTIES: AND
VtAKlNG TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS.

(3Ha) Except as provided in Subsection (bK acrediter may continue to make negative credit reports of
joint debtors under SectionTOC-7-107 and may report the repayment practices or credit history of
joint debtors under Chapter 14> Title 7, Credit Infor^
mation Exchange.

r H IS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS:
AMENDS;
tr* i UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953
;1 J-V AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTERS 72
' AND 100, LAWS OF UTAH 1985
, , . 4 ^ AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 1*2,
LAWS OF UTAH 1977
ENACTS:
i/i-4-6.5, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953
REPEALS AND REENACTS;
;M^2-5. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953

(b) With respect to a debtor who is not ordered by
the court under Sections 30-3-5 or 30-4-3 to make
paymente on a joint obligation, no negative credit
report under Section 7QC~7-1Q7, and no report of
the debtor's repayment practices or credit history
under Chapter 14. Title 7, Credit Information Exchange, may be made regarding the joint obligation
aftertrTe creditor is served notice of the court's order
as required under Subsection (2), unless the crectT
tor hag made a demand on the"5ebtor for payment
because of the failure to make payments by the otiv
er debtor, who is ordered by the court to make trie
payments.

IU> it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:

Section 3. Section Repealed and Reenactcd.

Section 1. Section Amended.
Section 1^-4-1. Utah Code Annotated 1953, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, ia amended to read:

Section 30-2-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is repealed and reenacted to read:
30-2-6. Separate debts*
(1) Neither Bpou&e ie personally liable for the separate debts,obligations, or liabilities of the other:

j 5-4-1. Definitions.

(a) contracted or incurred before marriage;

*urtedj:

(b) contracted or incurred during marriage, except family expenses as provided in Section 30-2-9;

(1) "Obligation* includes a liability in tort andcor^
vractual obligations; [^bliejw^-tncludco a porao*v4i-

(c) contracted or incurred after divorce or an order
for separate maintenance under this title; or

(2) "obligee" includes a creditor and a person having arightbased on a tort;
13 > "obligor* includes a debtor and a person liable
for a tort;

(d) ordered by the court to be paid by the other
spouse under Section 30-3-5 or 30-4-3 and not m
conflict with Section 15-4-6,5,
(2) The wages, earnings, property, rents, or other
income of one spouse may not be reached by a creditor of the other spouse to satisfy a debt, obligation,
or liability of the other spouse, as described under
Subsection (1).

i'4» Several obligors" mean3 obligors severity
bound for the same performance.
Section 2. Section Enacted*
Section 15-4-6.5. Utah Code Annotated 1953, is
enacted to read:

Section 4. Section Amended.

15-4-6.5, Divorce or separate maintenance: of
coobligors*
< 1) Qji the entering of a decree of divorce or separate maintenance of joint debtors in contractTtKe
claim of a creditor remains unchanged unless otlieT
wise provided by the contract or until a new contract
>s entered into between the creditor and the debtors
moTviduaily '
~—
~~
< 2t In addition to his duties as a secured party^under Section 70A-9-U2 and his duties afc a trustee or
beneficiary of a tniBt deed under Chapter 1, Title 57,
Conveyances, a creditor, who has been notified by
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Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
last amended by Chapters 72 and 100, Law? of Utah
1985, is amended to read:
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health care of parties and children — Division of debts — Court to have
continuing; jurisdiction — Custody and visitation —• Termination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree ofdivorc* is rendered, the court
may include in it equitable orders relating to the
children, property, debts or obligations, and parties.

The cou rt shall include the follow ing in every decree
of divorce:
<a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and dentai expenses of the dependent children; landl
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, an
order requiring the purchase and maintenance of
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent chiidranlrj; and
it) pursuant to Section 15-4-£-5:
(\) an order specifying which party is responsible
for the payment ofjoint debts, obligations, or liaSililies ofthe parties contracted or incurred during
marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respectivecrgditors or obligees, regarding the court's division offlebts, obligations, QT liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addressee; and
(in) provisions for the enforcement of these orders.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custo*
dial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent
children would be adequately cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to
provide the day care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training ofthe Custodial parent.

pay the reasonable attorney's Tees expended by the
prevailing party in that action, if the court determines that the petition was without merit and not
asserted in good faith.
Section 5» Section Amended.
Section 30-4-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
last amended by Chapter 122, Laws of Utah 1977, \n
amended to read:
30-4-3. Custody and maintenance of children — Property and debt division — Support payments.
(Jj In all actions brought [hefewderl under this
chapter the court may by order or decree^
(a) provide for the care, custody, and maintenance
ofThe minor children ofthe parties and may determine with which ofthe parties the children or any of
them shall remain; [may awardtogtlhcrapouafrpefr
session of any of-the-r^al or pcroonaV^atate-^f^he
e^he^-apQuae, and decree moneys]
(b) ii) provide for support of [that) either spouse
and the support ofthe minor children [-and] remain"
ing with that spouse;
(ii) provide how and when support payments shall
be madeH; and
(iii) provide that either spouse have a lien upon
the property ofthe other to secure payment ofthe
[SQIDC. Such] support or maintenance obligation;
(c) award to either spouse the possession of any
real or personal property of the other Bpouse or acquired by the spouses during the marriage; or
(d) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:

(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make
subsequent changes or new orders for the support
and maintenance ofthe parties, the custody ofthe
children and their support, maintenance, health,
and dental carts, or the distribution ofthe property
and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary.

(i) specify which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities contracted or incurred by the parties during the marriage;
(ii) require the parties to notify respective credi*
tors" or obligees regarding the court's division of
debts, obligations, and liabilities and regarding the
parties' separate, current addresses; and

(4) In determining visitation rights of parents,
grandparents, and other relatives, the court shall
consider the welfare of the child.

(iii) provide for the enforcement of these orders.

(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides
otherwise, any order ofthe court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void
ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the
party paying alimony is made a party to the action of
annulment and his rights are determined.

(2) The orders and decrees under this section may
be enforced by sale of any property ofthe spouse or
by contempt proceedings or otherwise as may be
necessary.
(3) The court may change the [allowance) support
or maintenance of a party from time to time according to circumstances, and may terminate altogether
any fa44wanee-made) obligation upon satisfactory
proof of voluntary and permanent reconciliation,
i^iieh-allownnec) An order or decree of support or
maintenance shall[rbeweve*d in every case be valid
only during the joint lives ofthe husband and wife.

(6) Any order ofthe court that a party pay alimony
to a former spouse terminates upon establishment
by the party paying alimony that the former spouse
is residing with a person ofthe opposite sex. However, if it is further established by the pereon receiving
alimony that that relationship or association is
without any sexual contact, payment of alimony
shall resume.
(71 When a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a court order is made
and denied, the court may order the petitioner to
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